Almost two years after the January 25th revolution, Cairo lives a paradoxical moment. Cairo is the main stage of the protests, whereby the political and social changes underway in Egypt find their repercussions on the urban scale. Between 2011 and 2012, the city experienced a material and institutional blockage that opposed its urban management to its daily practices. Today the metropolis finds a renewed attention from a number of actors that are mainly involved in 'civil society'. These actors aspire to 'revolutionise' urbanism.
The general popular enthusiasm created by the fall of Mubarak has rapidly made way for a collective feeling of disillusion. Process of transfer of power started with the transfer of power from the army to a civil regime and became effective through the election of Mohammed Morsi in June 2012. Cairo bears many marks of this transition period that are still very relevant six months after the presidential election.
Initially, the army took hold of Cairo's central spaces, putting in place a policy of control and blockage of the city. Despite Superior Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) originally supported mass gatherings since January 25th, it severely repressed them during the 'Battle of Mohamed Mahmoud Street' (Barthe, 2011). Afterwards, SCAF sought to block access to Tahrir square. Walls with reinforced barbwire were erected (photos 1 & 2) on most of axes leading to this symbolic spot of the revolution and the nearby Ministry of the Interior. This process of militarisation in downtown Cairo turned the Egyptian capital into a city-at-war. It has entailed two major consequences on the practices and representations of space.
Firstly, walls in downtown (four walls in November 2011 turn out to be six in May 2012) have forced pedestrians and cars to use alternative routes during six months. This phenomenon has intensified traffic-jams along Nile's banks and Abdeen area that are the only two possible ways to circumvent Tahrir and cross the river from either side. Though Tahrir has lost much of its status as centre of the city, particularly after the relocation of cultural institutions and economic activities to the periphery, it has remained a major traffic junction (CEDEJ, 2012b). Cutting off access to it necessarily has resulted into a blockage of the adjacent districts, incapable of absorbing the urban fluxes.
Moreover, closing this space fully contradicts its function of open area of movement and exchange during the revolution. In few months, army has managed to sabotage its main symbol. The romantic image of the square has emerged during Arab Spring was also spoiled by 'thugs' (baltaggy) and drug-dealers. They took advantage of army repression on protesters to settle in. They were only driven out of the square by the government during summer 2012.
Secondly, revolution period has also paused decision-making in the field of urban planning. It has blocked, rather institutionally than physically, the city. Improving standards of living in the urban space – especially for the 65% of Greater Cairo inhabitants living in ashwa'iyyat (CEDEJ, 2012a) –, was one of the core demands of the 2011 protests. Urbanisation remained a secondary concern during the legislative and presidential elections. No serious discourse emerged on a general urban policy recently. The newly elected President Morsi has committed in fact to a number of promises before his ascension to power: traffic reduction, construction of one million social housing units and the organisation of municipal elections. The latter has not yet taken place and it has been postponed to an unknown date. Financing the new social housing seems to be very problematic for the government, as the Minister of Housing recognised in a September 2012 interview to the press. Finally, no one in Cairo has noticed an improvement in traffic conditions, whether they are users or public transport personnel – on strike since September 2012 to achieve higher salaries. Furthermore, on several occasions throughout 2012, gas stations across the country were out of service. Rumours of a coming hike in prices have been fuelled by threats endangering the costly basic products subsidies programme. This created panic and shortages. Moreover, road-accidents killed over 15,000 people since 2011 (Elshahed, 2012), which is higher than victims of violences since the revolution.
(...)
By Roman Stadnicki (PhD in Geography in Cedej-Cairo), head of the "Urbanism and Sustainable Development" Section at the CEDEJ (CNRS/MAEE), Cairo. He recently co-organized the international conference "Revolts and Transitions in the Arab World: Towards a New Urban Agenda?" (Cairo, November 7th-9th).
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